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Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm
Efficiency in Emerging Markets?
Kevin J. Fandl, J.D., Ph.D.*
Abstract:
Blockchain technology has the potential to eliminate one of the most significant
barriers to economic growth through private business transactions in developing
countries—lack of trust. In a typical developed country, individuals and firms
conduct transactions within an institutional environment that offers security
through the enforcement of agreements. Transparent and effective courts, while
imperfect to be sure, enable parties to feel secure in their transactions even if
their level of trust in the other party is low. This security, in turn, facilitates
transactions far afield from high-trust relationships (e.g., immediate relatives),
generating transactions based upon economic value rather than party trust alone.
Developing countries often lack effective or transparent institutions and are
frequently plagued with corruption that weakens substantially their level of
security in economic transactions. Accordingly, individuals and firms in
developing countries seek contracting parties whom they trust, knowing that it is
trust that will ensure enforcement more than courts or law enforcement.
Transactions in this type of environment are thus limited to known entities, such
as relatives or colleagues who have a trust-relationship with the individual. As a
result, potentially valuable transactions are avoided due to lack of trust, which,
on a macro-level, limits the economic growth potential of the entire economy.
Blockchain technology and smart contracts offer a solution to the trust problem
prevalent in developing country contractual transactions. First, because
blockchain uses an open architecture, all transactions are publicly accessible,
immutable, and verifiable by anyone. This helps to eliminate corruption and fraud
from the transaction. Second, because all smart contract transactions are
recorded along a blockchain and cannot be modified ex post, a permanent and
publicly accessible ledger is available to shed any doubt about payments or other
transactions throughout the process. And third, because blockchain systems are
automated, security in the enforcement mechanism is all but guaranteed. For
instance, failure to deliver goods by a set time will automatically trigger a default
clause that transmits payment of liquidated damages to the injured party without
the intervention of a judge or arbitrator.
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(Lock Haven University), is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Strategic Global
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Numerous problems with this approach exist. For instance, access to information
about technology such as blockchain, especially among firms that would most
directly benefit from it (e.g., informal firms), is highly limited for the moment.
Second, smart contracts are in their infancy and work primarily with clearly
stipulated terms that allow for no interpretation, which are not always common
in contracts between firms. In this case, eliminating a neutral arbiter from the
transaction also eliminates the possibility of reviewing the circumstances of a
breach or other contract mishap. And third, though lack of trust in parties may
be reduced through this technology, lack of trust in online financial transactions
may be exacerbated. The use of electronic finance options in developing countries
is far less common than in developed countries, making implementation of a
completely online transmission system particularly challenging.
Despite the evident weaknesses in applying smart contracts and blockchain
technology to developing country firm transactions, there is great potential for at
least small-scale application in certain markets where party trust levels are
particularly low. In this paper, I will review literature on the development of
smart contract technology and its application in relevant contexts. I will consider
the potential impact that this technology could have if properly implemented in
emerging markets. And I will offer a set of suggestions for policymakers to
consider in educating firms and incentivizing their use of this technology. What
follows is an introduction to the area of smart contracts as a substitute or at least
a complement to legal institutions. I fully expect a robust literature to develop
around this topic in the near future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contracts are one of the key tools in existence to enable the conduct of
business.1 Long before the present-day concept of a legal contract was
codified by statute or, in the case of common law, precedent, merchants relied
on the premise of offer and acceptance to transact business.2 Enforcement of
contracts historically rested with merchant communities and, in larger or
more serious cases, with the ruling family.3 Today, enforcement power has
shifted to courts and similar legal institutions. Without that power of
enforcement, a contract was nothing more than a promise.4
Just as a contract is at the heart of a business transaction, effective
contract enforcement is at the heart of economic growth and development.5
Long-distance trade, especially between unfamiliar parties, depends on trust
in the institutions in existence to enforce the terms of the contract. This trust
replaces what historically only existed between family members and what,
therefore, largely limited the scope of trade.6
The importance of trust in trade cannot be overstated.7 Merchants of the
past engaged in transactions with those parties whom they knew or whom
their associates vouched for.8 Merchant guilds, tribes, and families built
reputations that enabled them to transact business on the basis of those
1

See generally Larry DiMatteo, Law as a Source of Strategic Advantage: Strategic
Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 732
(2010) (discussing the importance of the contract as a mechanism for conducting business).
2
Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 775,
784-785 (2011) (explaining the similarities between historical merchant transactions and
modern-day institutions).
3
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 273 (1778)
(discussing the jurisdictional limitations in the application of the lex mercatoria).
4
See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L L.
229, 275-277 (1999) (discussing the distinctions between relational and formal contract
settings, in which institutions play a leading role).
5
See generally Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, Contemporary Political Theory and
Private Law: The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development,
92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006) (providing a comprehensive examination of formal and informal
contract law enforcement and proposing that both could serve as effective substitutes for
formal legal institutions).
6
For an overview of “relational contracts,” see Ian Macneil, Relational Contract Theory:
Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 892-895 (2000).
7
For a comprehensive overview of the importance of trust in business transactions, see
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1996).
8
Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON.
& POL. 1, 2 (1990) (assessing the importance of trust and reputation in conducting business
transactions in the absence of legal institutions); see also Anjanette H. Raymond,
Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the Use of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea
for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 479, 506 (2005) (“Lex mercatoria utilizes
reputation as a vital indicator of an individual’s standing within the commercial community.
The impact on the reputation of a party is sometimes considered a more effective deterrent
than the judicial process.”).
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reputations. However, outsiders were rarely given the opportunity to engage
in anything more than petty trade with these communities since they had no
reputation to which the communities could look to for security.9
Merchant laws and enforcement techniques evolved into modern-day
business laws, courts and arbitral bodies.10 In developed countries today,
courts serve the role of guarantor to enable transactions to occur between
parties when the level of trust is insufficient alone. Failure by one party to
abide by the promises made to another leads to court intervention rather than
physical violence or excommunication from a given community as may have
happened in the past.
The trust that results from institutions operates on the premise that the
institutions are themselves effective. A corrupt system of courts in which
bribery more than justice drives decisions renders institutions ineffective and
eliminates the guarantor of trust.11 A court system that has no enforcement
mechanism due to under-resourced law enforcement authorities makes legal
decisions paper tigers.12 And slow, bureaucratic and complex legal systems
limit access to justice to those few able to navigate and expedite its
resolutions.
Many emerging markets today suffer from one or more of these
dilemmas. Corruption, ineffective enforcement, and bureaucracy can deprive
parties of the institutional guarantees that underlie transactions in developed
countries. Without effective institutions, parties are left to rely upon the
traditional notion of trust in the other party. Since there is no guarantee of
enforcement or the means to protect the nature of the transaction, lack of trust
will serve as a deterrent to entry into certain types of contracts.
Contracts are built on trust. Institutions provide that trust in the absence
of party familiarity and reputation. The strength of the institutions may
indeed drive economic development through the creation of a trust
environment that enables parties to take more risks in their business deals.13
9
See, e.g., Roberta Dessi & Salvatore Piccolo, Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social
Capital 11 (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. TSE-581, 2015) (describing the
limited access for outsiders to local merchant communities and highlighting the evolution of
foreign merchant guilds).
10 See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant, 48 AM. BUS. L.J.
775, 792-93 (2011) (describing the evolution of merchant law into modern law).
11 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A
Case Study of Russia, 10 S. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 232-33 (2002) (showing a bi-directional
relationship between corruption and weak institutions); Toke S. Aidt, Corruption, Institutions,
and Economic Development, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 271, 271-72 (2009) (discussing
the negative perception of business managers about corrupt institutional environments).
12 Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International
Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 470, 526 (1996) (explaining that “no institution is an island” and that institutions exist
within a broader context, affected by governance and public policy).
13 Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius & Katharina Pistor, Legal Institutions and
International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 163, 172 (2004) (finding that the strength of
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But when there is neither trust nor adequate institutions, the ability to enter
those deals, and thus the ability to contribute to economic development in a
trust-environment is substantially weakened.
In this short paper, I will take a first step in trying to understand how
low-trust environments limit opportunities for economic growth and
development in emerging markets, and I will examine how the advent of
blockchain technology—specifically smart contracts—might strengthen that
trust environment in the absence of effective institutions. The paper is broken
down into three sections. First, I will describe the problem of doing business
in low-trust environments and the role that institutions play in circumventing
the trust problem. Second, I will provide a foundational overview of
blockchain technology and smart contracts in the context of generating trust.
And finally, I will apply these ideas to the economic development context to
generate discussion and further research about useful applications in the
future.
II. TRUST: THE FOUNDATION FOR DOING BUSINESS
A. The Basis for Contracts
To address the issue of how contracts underlie business, and how trust
necessarily informs the effectiveness of those contracts, we must begin at the
beginning with an examination of the contract itself. It is important at the
outset to bear in mind that different jurisdictions across the world view
contracts distinctly, yet all spring from a similar origin.14 In the majority of
the world, which follow civil law precepts, contracts are identified by
compliance with certain statutory requirements known to the parties. In the
common law world, though statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code
provide some guidance to parties, most contractual arrangements arise based
upon party interactions and intent. Given these different interpretations of
contracts, our first question must necessarily be, what is a contract?
A simple definition for a contract might be a legally enforceable
promise. But that is a far cry from the intricacies of contracts in both civil
and common law systems. The common law’s Restatement of Contracts
defines a contract as, “A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law
in some way recognizes as a duty.”15 Civil law differs in that it lays out
certain elements of proper contract formation, including free and informed
consent, capacity to contract, and lawful object and purpose.16
legal institutions determine key economic indicators, such as levels of international trade).
14 See Kevin J. Fandl, Cross-Border Commercial Contracts and Consideration, 34
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2016).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
16 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [[CIVIL CODE] art. 1108 (Fr.); but see id. at art. 1128 (revising the
French civil code to eliminate the requirement for lawful cause); Solene Rowan, The New

338

Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm Efficiency?
40:333 (2020)

In both instances, the goal is to distinguish mere promises from those
promises for which parties can look to the law to provide remedies in the
event of breach. The Latin term nudum pactum refers to a set of promises
that are not enforceable by law. An unenforceable promise, for instance,
might include the promise to gift an object to another party.17 Lack of
consideration would make such a promise unenforceable in common law
jurisdictions, though civil law jurisdictions would permit it if it was
accompanied by a notarial document.18 Similarly, a set of promises for which
no evidence can be provided to prove their existence would be considered by
both jurisdictions as unenforceable.19
While the civil law adhered to the concept of pacta sunt servanda,
meaning that a person must perform their legal obligations, the common law
maintained a more formless system for creating contracts, leaving much in
the hands of the judges to interpret party interactions.20 This has led to some
differing determinations about which promises to enforce and which to leave
in the hands of the parties making the promises.21 Yet the foundation in both
systems of contract law is the making of the promise and the intent to be
bound by that promise.
Making a promise to perform some obligation necessarily involves
risk.22 Whether the promise is to deliver a container of luxury goods to a
given destination by a set date or to pay for your meal at a fast food restaurant,
the obligation being made by both parties involves an element of risk—
namely, risk that the counterparty will fail to fully or properly perform their
obligation under the agreement. This risk is mitigated principally by one
concept—trust.23
“By making a promise, a person invites another to trust, and to break a
promise is to abuse that trust.”24
The need for certain promises to be trustworthy is a reason why the
law should enforce them. Contract law fortifies trust insofar as it
provides grounds for confidence that another will perform a promise.
French Law of Contract, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 805, 814 (2017).
17 See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift,
85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997).
18 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 931-32 (Fr.).
19 See, e.g., Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 (Eng.).
20 See, e.g., Arthur von Mehren, The French Civil Code and Contract: A Comparative
Analysis of Formation and Form, 15 LA. L. REV. 687, 698-710 (1955) (providing a historical
analysis of the development of common and civil law contract systems).
21 See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 14 at 111-12 (discussing the distinctions between common
and civil law contracts during the early formation of contact law).
22 Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 120-21 (1984)
(describing the transaction costs associated with contract formation).
23 Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 656-57 (2010)
(describing the relational trust aspects of effective contract formation).
24 Anthony J. Bellia, Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 25 (2002).
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If the law renders a certain promise enforceable, a person may trust
(have good grounds for confidence) that it will be performed. A
degree of trust in certain promises is necessary, contract theorists say,
for the realization of the goods that each asserts justifies a law of
contract.25

Certain types of promises undoubtedly require more trust.26 For
instance, a promise to provide a cup of coffee in exchange for five dollars
would require minimal trust between the consumer and the coffee vendor;
however, a promise to ship a container of luxury goods from Los Angeles to
Shanghai between two unrelated first-time business partners would require
substantial trust. The risk in the latter transaction is exceedingly high due to
the variety of unknowns, including the reputation of the party, the financial
position of the party, and the financial commitment.
Many of the risks that we face in contracting appear to be mitigated by
the creation of binding documents, such as letters of credit, commitment
letters, and the contract itself. However, without an effective and reliable
institution to enforce those documents, they are nothing more than paper. For
this reason, it is essential to examine the institutional environment and its
own inherent risks in generating a sense of trust.
B. Institutions and Trust
Nobel Laureate Douglass North told us in 1991 that “[i]nstitutions are
the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions,
laws, property rights).”27 According to North, institutions serve to reduce the
transaction costs associated with human interactions. In particular, he
explains that the importance of institutions arose along with the expansion of
trade. As early traders began to engage in more long-distance ventures,
reliable institutions (both informal and formal) were necessary to provide
security in the transaction.28
The institutions that North spoke about track the historical nature of
societal structure—commonly agreed upon rules are established; a body is
organized to interpret and apply those rules; another body is created to
enforce punishments for violating those rules. In a modern society, we might
see these as laws, courts and arbitrators, and law enforcement. But, at least
according to North, these institutions are essential to economic development:
“the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of
contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and
25

Id. at 27.
See generally Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L. J. 1457 (2005) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the legal concept of trust and its impact on institutions).
27 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991).
28 Id. at 99-100.
26
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contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”29
The definition of an “institution” for purposes of this discussion
includes both informal and formal legal constraints meant to restrict an
individual’s actions and protect their interests.30 Laws are a prime example
of institutions as they delineate the actions that a party can or cannot take and
prescribe punishments for actions taken outside those constraints. The
equivalent informal constraint would be best practices, morals, and
community value systems that serve the same purpose as laws.31
There are a host of problems with this approach. First, jurisdiction poses
a substantial problem as laws generally have only domestic application and
law enforcement lacks extraterritorial power.32 Thus, while parties to a
contractual transaction in Philadelphia and New York may find comfort in
the legal institutions that govern their engagement, a transaction between
parties in Philadelphia and Bogotá33 will be far less assuring. A number of
mechanisms have arisen to try to build the necessary institutional
environment around cross-jurisdictional transactions, including arbitration,
international treaties, and diplomacy.34 However, for a party operating in an
efficient institutional environment, none of these mechanisms effectively
substitutes the comfort that a party has in their domestic legal system.
Second, in order for institutions to be effective, they must be
transparent, just, and accessible.35 In much of the world, institutions lack
29 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 54 (1990).
30 Julio Faundez, Douglass North’s Theory of Institutions: Lessons for Law and
Development, 8 HAGUE J. RULE L. 373, 385 (2016).
31 See Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions in Economic Development,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 10-12 (2008) (describing the nature of informal legal systems and
constraints); Francis Fukuyama, Address at the IMF Conference on Second Generation
Reforms: Social Capital and Civil Society (Oct. 1, 1999), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs
/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm (highlighting the importance of informal legal norms
in modern economies).
32 See generally Phillip Wm. Lear & Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court
Remedies: Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmative Action, 71 N.D. L. REV. 277, 308-309
(1995) (stipulating that extraterritorial enforcement of contract law is a matter generally left
to treaty law).
33 Legal institutions in Colombia and much of Latin America are generally considered
untrustworthy by business professionals. See, e.g., INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
BETTER SPENDING FOR BETTER LIVES: HOW LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN CAN DO
MORE WITH LESS, (Alejandro Izquierdo, et al. eds, 2018) (discussing the effects of declining
trust in communities and institutions in Latin America), https://flagships.iadb.org/
en/DIA2018/Better-Spending-for-Better-Lives.
34 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Lucien Dhooge, Stephanie Greene, Virginia Maurer,
& Marisa Pagnattaro, The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen
Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299 (2004) (examining a number of
remedies utilized in international sales contracts).
35 See Clifton Johnson, General Counsel of Int’l Develop. L. Org., Address at
International Scientific Conference: “The development of the Court Administration:
directions and model”: Enhancing Judicial Transparency and Promoting Public Trust (June
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these qualities, either due to corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency.
Arbitration functions as a suitable substitute for effective courts; however,
enforcement mechanisms continue to fall within the sphere of the state,
meaning that even if an effective judgment can be attained, enforcing that
judgment often poses the same problems inherent in the court system itself.
In these jurisdictions, informal mechanisms such as reputational trust, often
combined with the threat of violence, can serve as a more effective avenue
to create constraints on the parties.36
Third, access to institutions—even the most effective ones—comes at a
financial cost. Though court access is usually a minimal financial burden,
effective legal counsel can add significant expense to a transaction. Similarly,
the use of arbitral mechanisms, which are often private, can generate
substantial costs. These costs may limit the options of parties to lower-value
transactions that could potentially lose more by seeking resolution than they
lost as a result of the bad behavior of their counterparty.
Though many other limitations exist, we can take these three as
indicative of the larger problem of institutions, whether formal or informal.
Reliance on institutions as a source of trust in a transaction adds risk, cost,
and unpredictability. In effect, though institutions offer security to many
transactions and generate a sense of trust amongst parties that may in itself
promote good behavior, an institution is a third-party that is joining the
transaction, and that third-party can weaken, just as easily as it can
strengthen, the trust between parties.
III. BLOCKCHAIN AND THE MANUFACTURING OF TRUST
A. Trust Environments
In a low-trust environment, reputation is everything. Without a positive
reputation, and the necessary contacts to go along with that reputation, there
is little chance of broad economic growth through expansive business
transactions. Commercial activity will be limited to small circles of trust that
largely exclude outside, unknown relationships that may be beneficial to both
parties.37 These low-trust environments create a clan-based mentality that
restricts opportunity.
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature (which
28,
2018),
https://www.idlo.int/news/speeches-and-advocacy/enhancing-judicialtransparency-and-promoting-public-trust.
36 Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359,
360 (1994) (“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction.”).
37 John Helliwell, Economic Growth and Social Capital in Asia 15-16 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996) (finding that higher levels of societal trust
yield stronger economic performance).
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is a condition of war of every man against every man,) upon any
reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set
over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance,
it is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other
will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear
of some coercive power . . . .
But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those that
would otherwise violate their faith . . . he which by the covenant is to
perform first, is obliged so to do.38

As discussed above, the advent of institutions has helped tremendously
to overcome the limitations of this clan-based mentality. Institutions provide
the foundation for providing security in low-trust environments, promising
the same type of protections that would be afforded in a high-trust
environment. They substitute rules and consequences for reputation,
leveraging the resources of a government or similar body to provide the
parties with confidence that their relationship can proceed even in the
absence of trust.
[T]rust represents the ‘‘key building block of society” and thus also
plays an essential role for the formation of interactions and
relationships in the context of peer-to-peer marketplaces and services.
For example, renting out an apartment on Airbnb does not only require
hosts to trust potential guests to behave in a considerate and respectful
manner (toward both the host and the apartment) but also to trust in
Airbnb’s ability, integrity, and benevolence with regard to booking
and payment processes. Also guests heavily rely on their (prospective)
host and the offered apartment to be adequate and fulfill their needs.
In all this, the platform provides not only the technical infrastructure,
user interfaces, and process guidance but also services such as
insurance and reputation systems, thus taking a pivotal role in
establishing and maintaining trust among users.39

Nobel Laureate Douglass North has argued in the past that institutions
help to reduce the transaction costs associated with entering into business
relationships.40 The more efficient an institutional environment, including the
courts, legal system and law enforcement, the less burden on the parties to
see their transaction through to its intended conclusion. However, even the
38

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
See Florian Hawlitschek, Benedikt Notheisen, & Timm Teubner, The limits of trustfree systems: A literature review on blockchain technology and trust in the sharing economy,
29 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 50, 50-51 (2018) (quoting Sundararajan Mazzella,
A., D’Espous, V. & Möhlmann, M., How digital trust powers the sharing economy, IESE
INSIGHT 24, 27 (2016)); see also Florian Hawlitschek, et al., Trust in the Sharing Economy:
An Experimental Framework, 70 SWISS J. BUS. RES. & PRAC. 26 (2016).
40 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991).
39
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most efficient institutions do not eliminate transaction costs. Moreover, not
all institutional environments are created the same. Many developing
countries (and some developed countries) are bound to weak institutional
environments that provide little or no reasonable protection for parties to a
business transaction, leaving the parties to rely upon relational trust,
reputation, and informal means of protection for their transaction. Informal
contract enforcement and dispute resolution can be very effective; however,
informal mechanisms impose significant limitations on the environment
within which transactions occur. 41
Parties enter into contracts when they can be ensured that their
commitments will be legally enforced. This enforcement historically
occurred through informal mechanisms, such as guilds and similar merchant
organizations. The rise of institutions, such as courts and law enforcement,
enabled trust-based transactions to take place beyond small communities.42
And today, powerful domestic institutions in many parts of the world, along
with international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, enable
global transactions between unrelated parties to occur in an environment of
trust.43 However, in an institutional environment in which trust in those
institutions is low, parties may be significantly less likely to engage in
transactions with unrelated parties due to the increased risk of nonenforcement. “An inherent constraint on traditional contracting is that the
parties must trust the state, and a variety of private intermediaries that
facilitate efficient operation of the system.”44 In those environments in which
the level of trust in the state is low, parties often resort to informal
mechanisms, which, as noted above, constrain their opportunities to operate
outside of their relational trust environment.
The constraints imposed by an informal institutional environment have
been linked to slower overall economic growth.45 Parties that cannot easily
operate outside of their relational trust circle, due to concerns over the risk
associated with doing so, may pass up otherwise lucrative growth
opportunities. The risk mitigation provided by effective, formal institutions
41 See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1519, 1522 (2006) (discussing
the challenges in enforcing contracts outside the traditional legal system).
42 See generally Leon Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law,
53 U. TORONTO L. J. 265 (2003).
43 See, e.g., World Trade Organization, ICC-WTO Small Business Champions,
https://www.wto.org/english/ forums_e/business_e/sbc_e.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2020)
(highlighting one of the WTO initiatives targeting increasing participation by small businesses
in international trade).
44 Kevin Werbach & Nicholas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 330
(Nov. 2017).
45 Douglass C. North, Institutions and Growth, in JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN & DAVID A. LAKE,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 47-59
(2000) (describing from a historical perspective the central role played by institutions in
fostering economic growth).
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opens the door to non-relational business transactions, essentially inserting a
trust element into a transaction with significant trust-related risks.
Until now, parties in low-trust environments caused by ineffective
institutions have had little choice but to depend on informal institutions as a
means to facilitate their business transactions. Reform of those institutions
has been an intense effort by a number of multilateral and nonprofit
organizations for the past few decades.46 Yet, little progress has been made
in this effort. Technology may offer a solution in the form of blockchain.
Rather than replicating the traditional structure of institutions in a more
advanced manner, blockchain appears to be modernizing the historical trust
environment in which a community of disinterested yet trusted parties could
be counted upon to provide the foundations of trust for a given transaction.
The next section will explain the fundamentals of blockchain and how it may
fit into the broader trust environment of business transactions.
B. Blockchain
A blockchain is an electronic distributed ledger that utilizes multiple
computers to verify and record transactions without the possibility for
modification. Or, in a simpler sense, it is a means to permanently and
unalterably record a transaction. These transactions might be purchases of
goods using Bitcoin, whereby the use of the Bitcoin is permanently and
unalterably recorded so that the spent Bitcoin cannot be reused; or they may
be completion of a performance element of a contract, whereby the
beneficiary of that performance cannot withhold their resulting obligations
as the record of performance has been made.
The concept of blockchain originated with a white paper written by
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, which largely focused on Bitcoin.47 Mr.
Nakamoto’s paper suggested that technology had the ability to substitute for
institutions the trust elements of certain types of transactions.48 This new
technology was first debuted in 2009 with the advent of Bitcoin, the first
electronic currency not tied to any institution but linked only to blockchain
technology.
Bitcoin (and blockchain generally) operates with a number of nodes,
which are computers connected to a network.49 These nodes operate together
to verify the users on the network and the validity of the transactions. This is
accomplished by first verifying the users attempting to engage in a
46 See, e.g., Justice and Development, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/
topic/governance/brief/justice-rights-and-public-safety (highlighting several law and justice
initiatives of the World Bank).
47 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), https://
bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
48 Id.
49 Tara Mandjee, Bitcoin, its Legal Classification and its Regulatory Framework, 15 J.
BUS. & SEC. L. 157, 161–62 (2015) (defining Bitcoin and its role as a new currency).

345

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:333 (2020)

transaction, for instance, buying and selling Bitcoins. A public and private
user key is utilized to create a digital signature certifying that the users are
who they say they are.50 Then, the nodes review the ledger associated with
the users and the Bitcoins in their transaction to confirm that they are
legitimate and available for transactions. Assuming the users and the
transaction are properly verified, the transaction proceeds and the changes
are immediately recorded in the ledger—the blockchain—to ensure that
further transactions occur on the basis of what has been recorded in that
ledger.
The opportunity for fraud and cheating in a system like this seems
rampant. However, the system was cleverly designed to integrate protections
that largely eliminate the risk of fraud. In order for a node to validate (or
invalidate) a transaction within the network, that computer must solve a
complex mathematical problem that requires immense guessing; however,
the mathematical problem is so complex that it would take a single computer
years to solve.51 Thus, to change or validate the transaction, each node must
work with other nodes in the network to answer the problem collectively.52
Once the problem is solved by one of the nodes, that computer must share its
“proof of work” with other computers on the network to verify its problemsolving. This means that a potential hacker or fraudster would have to
compromise seemingly innumerable computers in order to potentially pass
off fraudulent data.53
Blockchain is seen to possess five key elements that make it a good
substitute for institutions in business transactions: 1) consensus, 2) validity,
3) uniqueness, 4) immutability, and 5) authenticity.54 Note that these key
elements are labeled differently, but function the same way, throughout the
blockchain literature.55
Consensus refers to the community of users in the blockchain network
that verify the validity of transactions. Miners are users that actively attempt
to solve the complex mathematical problems described above in order to earn

50

Id. at 162.
Jesse Marks, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Corruption the Killer App?, 20
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 48–49 (2018).
52 Note that the incentive for a particular node to engage in the mathematical problemsolving is to earn Bitcoins as a reward. This is a practice known as mining Bitcoins. See, e.g.,
Mike Orcutt, How Secure is Blockchain Really?, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610836/how-secure-is-blockchain-really/.
53 Marks supra note 51, at 47–48.
54 Richard Gendal Brown, Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed for
Financial Services (Apr. 5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-adistributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services/.
55 See, e.g., Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy & Rachel Wilka, Smart Contracts,
Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 313,
319 (2018) (describing these elements as consensus, provenance, immutability, finality, and
decentralization).
51
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Bitcoins as a reward for their efforts.56 Once they solve a problem, they must
share their proof of work with the other users on the network, who in turn
validate their entries. If validated, a new block is created within the ledger
for the validated transaction and that block is copied to every other computer
on the network, giving all users copies of the updated ledger.57
Validity is one of the key elements that I will discuss in the context of
smart contracts. In essence, validity refers to the immediate clearance of a
transaction due to the presumed immutability of the blockchain along which
it occurred and the validation of the users and their accounts.58 Validity
occurs through the automation of certain transactional elements, such as the
automatic distribution of funds once a certain performance is completed, or
the release of goods once payment has been verified.
Uniqueness refers to the built-in protocol that prevents someone from
making the same transaction using the same funds or data element twice. In
other words, the system design prevents a user from repeating the same
transaction, such as by spending the same Bitcoin twice. In order to clear a
transaction, at least half of the nodes in the network must validate the
transaction. An attempt by a user to re-spend a Bitcoin would be rejected by
those nodes because those nodes would see that the previously completed
transaction in the blockchain has already been copied to their ledgers.59
Immutability refers to the inability of a user to change a past transaction
without substantial effort and verification. This feature is achieved through a
combination of two parts of the blockchain process: hashes and the consensus
protocol.60 The hash is a unique fingerprint assigned to the miner that
successfully solves the mathematical problem required to create a block for
the verified transaction. That hash is unique to the user and transaction.
Altering the block would require the generation of a new hash that requires
completion, once again, of a new mathematical challenge. If that were
achieved, the user would then have to create a new hash for all subsequent
transactions (blocks) along the same ledger (chain). Any conflicting
information would lead to immediate rejection of the change by the
computers along the node, each of which maintains a copy of the previously
verified blocks and their unique hashes.
The final element in blockchain technology is authenticity. Every user
in a blockchain transaction possesses both a public key and a private key—
codes that only the user has access to and that are linked together. The private
key is used to create the encryption sequence embedded in the public key,
and thus only the holder of the private key can decrypt a transaction

56
57
58
59
60

See Orcutt, supra note 52.
See Marks, supra note 51, at 50–51.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
See Orcutt, supra note 52.
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containing that particular public key.61 This is accomplished through the
creation of a digital signature, which every user must use to conduct
transactions in the network. Of course, this is potentially problematic as users
that lose their private key would no longer have access to the transactions
along the blockchain and may lose ownership of the Bitcoins associated with
the transaction.62
These elements offer the promise of trust in the absence of institutions.
The minimal risk of corruption or fraud, the substantial level of transparency,
and the certainty of recordation make blockchain a viable alternative to a
weak institutional environment for business transactions. Blockchain has the
potential to remove the institutional element from the business environment
without removing the efficiency and confidence those institutions are meant
to provide. By doing so, transaction costs are largely reduced to zero since,
in a smart contract transaction for instance, there are few, if any, costs
associated with enforcement of the promises—all of which would be
automated.
With respect to business transactions, “[t]he law provides a source of
confidence, not a guarantee, that a promise will be performed. If a promisor
breaches a contract, the promisee does not magically receive the promised
performance or even its monetary equivalent.”63 Blockchain appears to be a
potential substitute for those institutions that might be used when the
institutions fail.
C. Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are one of the technological possibilities that came into
existence because of blockchain technology. The cryptographer Nick Szabo
coined the term smart contract in 1996, which he defined as “a set of
promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which the
parties perform on these promises.”64 For Szabo, the smart contract was made
possible due to the Internet and increasing sophistication of computer
processing abilities, which he believed, in time, would lead to a transition of
contracts to a purely digitized environment.
At the time of Szabo’s prediction, some elements of contracts had
already been moving into the digital environment. Certain financial
transactions, such as the auto-execution of securities purchases, were
becoming more common, adding both efficiency and security to what had
61

Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to
Distributed and Centralised Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2018).
62 See, e.g., Gregory Barber, A Crypto Exchange CEO Dies – With the Only Key to $137
Million, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/crypto-exchange-ceodies-holding-only-key (describing the death of Canadian Gerry Cotton, who died without
leaving behind his key to access the millions of dollars in Bitcoins that are now, presumably,
lost in the ether).
63 Bellia, supra note 24, at 34.
64 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, EXTROPY, 1996.
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been human-controlled (and thus subject to error) actions.65 Yet these preblockchain smart contracts still relied substantially on human input and
review to ensure that the technology was functioning as intended.
When blockchain appeared on the scene, smart contracts were given a
new persona as potentially independent transactions without the need for
human input beyond the initiation of the transaction.66 A smart contract is “a
set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which
the parties perform on those promises.”67 It is a contract that relies upon
automation and code to make a traditional contractual transaction more
efficient and secure.
At its core, a smart contract is still a contract. In order for it to have legal
effect and be enforceable in court, if necessary, the contract still requires all
of the basic elements of offer, acceptance, intent, and, in common law
jurisdictions, consideration.68 Yet the verification that the contract was
properly formed and that performance was properly executed would not take
place through negotiation, arbitration or judicial intervention; rather, it would
take place automatically within the blockchain network.
What turns a traditional contract into a smart contract is automation, or
in programmatic language, “if/then” conditions built into computer code. A
simple smart contract might include a term that will release the lien on a piece
of property automatically once payment has been processed. It might release
funds held in escrow once goods have been received by a shipper. It may
facilitate a judge-less execution of a will.69 It may allow for two parties to
negotiate the lease of a car using automated interactions based upon
predefined conditions set by the parties, giving a whole new meaning to
haggling.70 Or it might terminate a contract once a key deadline has passed
without expected performance logged. In each of these scenarios, computers
are used to execute conditional clauses in a contract once the conditions have
been satisfied (or once a performance deadline has passed)—a rather
simplistic function given the complexity of computers today.71
Practically speaking, while traditional contracts are created on paper or
something similar, smart contracts must be created via computer code. The
65 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 320–23 (describing Professor Harry Surden’s
explanation of the evolution of digitized contracts).
66 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 321–22.
67 Szabo supra note 64.
68 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 322–23.
69 Etienne Dusseault, Introduction to Solidity Programming and Smart Contracts (For
Complete Beginners), MEDIUM (Aug. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/coinmonks/introductionto-solidity-programming-and-smart-contracts-for-complete-beginnerseb46472058cf (providing a crude example of the execution of a “smart will”).
70 Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
263, 273–74 (2017).
71 See McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 323–25 (explaining the limited usage of smart
contracts in 2018).
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debate about the distinction of the two forms is beyond the scope of this
article.72 What is of importance to this fundamental examination of smart
contracts is how they might provide an alternative to traditional legal
institutions, thus offering a tool to facilitate business transactions with trust
built into the code of the contract. The use of smart contracts to replace
traditional contracts has the power to potentially eliminate the need for
institutional support, from interpretation to enforcement of promises.73
Most smart contracts drafted as of the date of this article are created
using a programming language known as Solidity.74 This is one of four major
programming languages used in blockchain.75 Solidity was created in 2014
by developers at Ethereum.76 Ethereum is a blockchain platform created in
2014 by a Swiss nonprofit known as the Ethereum Foundation.77 Its asserted
function is to operate as “a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts:
applications that run exactly as programmed without any possibility of
downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference.”78 Solidity is one of
the key languages used to program smart contracts on the Ethereum platform.
Smart contracts offer a number of advantages over traditional contracts.
First, they obviate the need for judicial intervention to determine whether a
valid contract has been formed and what it consists of. There would be no
more need for a parole evidence rule, or challenges to the mutual assent of
the parties as the smart contract would not allow performance to begin unless,
and until, all of the relevant formation factors had been accounted for and
satisfied.79 Disputes over whether parties actually agreed to given terms
would be avoided. Of course, it would no longer be possible for verbal
contracts to come into existence in the smart contract context either.
Second, much of the security provided during traditional contract
negotiations through representations and warranties would be rendered
72

For more information about the formation of smart contracts, see generally Smart
Contracts & Legal Enforceability, CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT REPORT #2 (Oct. 2018),
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/2020-01/smart_ contracts_report_2_0.pdf.
73 See, e.g., Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning
of the End of Classic Contract Law 21, (Nat’l Research Univ. Higher Sch. of Econ., Working
Paper No. BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2885241 (suggesting that smart contracts operate without the need for a legal
system).
74 Introduction to Smart Contracts, SOLIDITY, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.6/
introduction-to-smart-contracts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
75 The other three programming languages used in blockchain are Serpent, Viper and
Mutan.
76 See generally Tiffany L. Minks, Ethereum and the SEC: Why Most Distributed
Autonomous Organizations are Subject to the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933 and a Proposal for New Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 408–10 (2018)
(explaining the rise and impact of Ethereum).
77 ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
78 Id.
79 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 326–27.
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unnecessary with a smart contract.80 Those traditional statements protect a
party in the event that their counterparty lied or withheld information relevant
to the agreement.81 For instance, if a party misstated their financial liquidity,
a representation would protect the other party in the event of bankruptcy. A
smart contract avoids the need for such protections as conditional
performance language can be written into the code, triggering certain
outcomes in the event of party misstatements, such as transferring funds
automatically in the event of a default.
Third, and quite significant in terms of the forthcoming discussion about
smart contracts in developing countries, the enforcement provisions built into
smart contracts offer a superior remedy for parties to a dispute.82 The key
here is automation. Rather than having to draft a choice of law and choice of
forum clause in a contract, or relying on conventions such as the Uniform
Commercial Code or the Convention on the International Sale of Goods,
parties to a smart contract enjoy the benefits of strict compliance with the
stated performance obligations in the agreement.83 If the performance
obligations are not met, a trigger is executed by which the non-breaching
party is made whole.84 For instance, if a party failed to deliver the requested
goods on time, payment, which may have been held in escrow, is returned to
the buyer and, if deposits were made for liquidated damages, the buyer may
receive access to those funds as well, all without the need to involve
arbitrators or the courts.
A key element that readers should understand about smart contracts is
that they exist in a pre-determined environment with conditions established
ex-ante, meaning that the work going into a contract to ensure that it is
accurate and precise is likely more extensive than that of a traditional
contract, which may count on negotiation and favorable interpretation postexecution.85 Likewise, the risk of default is much greater in a smart contract
given the automated enforcement provisions and lack of flexibility in
interpreting party intent for their actions.
The inflexibility in a smart contract is the result of technological
limitations. As of this writing, a smart contract cannot be designed to
interpret common traditional contract terms such as “best efforts” or

80

Id. at 328–29.
See, e.g., Tina Stark, Nonbinding Opinion, 15 BUS. L. TODAY 3 (2006) (discussing the
remedies available at common law for misrepresenting a statement of fact).
82 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 331–32 (explaining that smart contracts provide
a more secure mechanism for enforcement in the form of automation); but see McKinney,
supra note 55, at 330–40 (describing potential enforcement problems, such as a party closing
their linked bank account in order to avoid automatic deductions).
83 But see Sklaroff, supra note 70, at 277 (suggesting that parties tied to an inflexible
smart contract may seek informal dispute resolution outside the confines of the agreement).
84 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 330.
85 Skalroff, supra note 70, at 280–81.
81
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“commercially reasonably efforts.”86 However, new advances in artificial
intelligence may pave the way for more complex interpretive abilities in
computers and, thus, a more expansive application of smart contracts in the
future.87
Of course, numerous problems exist with these purported benefits.88
Smart contracts, as they exist today, can operate only in a very limited range
of agreements, all of which involve “if/then” triggers as opposed to complex
obligations. Smart contracts still require human input to develop the code that
will be executed in the blockchain environment. And smart contracts remain
quite inflexible, offering no room for interpretation, waiver, or modification
once a contract has been executed.89 Yet despite these (and other) problems,
smart contracts have the potential to evolve into powerful tools that enable
users to operate in a trust-oriented environment built without legal
institutions.
IV. CAN BLOCKCHAIN ENHANCE GROWTH IN EMERGING
MARKETS?
Economic growth in developing country markets typically trends
behind that found in developed economies. Instability, corruption, and a
variety of environmental and political factors play a role in holding some of
these countries back. However, development economists have long found
that one of the most effective targets for reform to promote growth in these
countries is the strengthening of their institutional environments.90 And while
they have been cautious to credit legal reform in particular with sparking
economic growth, they have agreed broadly that effective institutions enable
an environment of trust that facilitates business.91
86 Id. at 281 (providing an example of a contract to work with a sales agent in which the
term “commercially reasonable efforts” is used as a condition of performance).
87 See, e.g., Huu Nguyen and Scott Bailey, Use of Artificial Intelligence for Smart
Contracts and Blockchains, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS FINTECH LAW REPORT vol. 21
(March/April 2018).
88 For an overview of several other problems faced by smart contracts within the current
legal environment, see generally McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 330–40 (describing topics
such as state law distinctions, the statute of frauds, and ethical considerations in smart contract
enforcement).
89 See Sklaroff, supra note 70, at 276 (explaining that “the transactional relationship
created by a smart contract between two firms must be completely formed and precisely
defined, eliminating forms of flexibility that are crucial to the contracting process.”).
90 See generally Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule
of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 99, 102 (2004); ROBERT J.
BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY
(1997).
91 See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and
Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008) (surveying rule of law
literature and finding that law legal reform has a positive effect on economic growth but is
one of numerous key factors); see also Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, The Role of
Institutions in Growth and Development (Comm’n on Growth and Dev., Working Paper No.
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Emerging markets in many instances function within weak institutional
environments, either due to bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption.92
Consumers and businesses rely less on courts and law enforcement to protect
their promises than they might in developed countries that enjoy a more
efficient institutional environment. Reforming the institutions within
developing countries has been a goal of economic development programs for
many years, yet success has been elusive.93
Institutional change is a slow-moving process that usually involves
small adjustments rather than complete redevelopment.94 “Rather than
abruptly dismantling the rules, then, actors slowly subvert, build around, or
redirect them.”95 Aside from the occasional coup d’état that effectively
revamps complete institutional environments, such as what we witnessed in
Chile during the Pinochet years,96 ineffective institutions remain ineffective
in spite of efforts to change them.
Is blockchain the answer? As discussed above, blockchain has the
potential to remove the need for formal institutions to facilitate trust and see
promises through to their intended conclusions.97 Could smart contracts then
substitute for an efficient institutional structure in emerging markets,
sparking the economic growth that has been held back within the weak
institutional environment? Or will they always be an alternative to traditional
contracts but never a replacement?98
The centralized system of institutions that has driven economic
10, 2008), https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-133899
7241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_10_Role_Institutions_Growth_
Development.pdf.
92 Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A CrossNational Test of an Institutional Explanation, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 590, 590 (1997).
93 See generally Investment Policy and Promotion, WORLD BANK (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/investment-climate/brief/investment-policy-andpromotion.
94 See James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, in
EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER 15 (James Mahoney
& Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010); Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction:
Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY:
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES 19-22 (Wolfgang Streeck &
Kathleen Thelen, eds., 2005).
95 Steven Levitsky & Maria Victoria Murillo, Building Institutions on Weak Foundations:
Lessons from Latin America, in REFLECTIONS ON UNEVEN DEMOCRACIES: THE LEGACY OF
GUILLERMO O’DONNELL 189, 192 (Daniel Brinks, Marcelo Leiras, & Scott Mainwaring eds.,
2014).
96 Robert A. Packenham & William Ratliff, What Pinochet did for Chile, HOOVER
INSTITUTION, (Jan. 30, 2007), https://www.hoover.org/research/what-pinochet-did-chile.
97 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 325 (describing the inherent trust built into
Bitcoin transactions within the blockchain).
98 Id. at 363 (arguing that smart contracts are inherently distinct from traditional contracts
in that they rely not on contract law but on code crafted by the parties, and thus provide
inherently distinct remedies).
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development through widespread and long-distance contractual transactions
has proven to be largely ineffective in many developing markets. Smart
contracts executed within the blockchain environment provide a
decentralized ledger system that builds trust into each element of each
transaction without the need for a central authority to confirm its validity.99
The distributed ledger system effectively engages a community of
participants in the validation of each contract transaction by building its
elements along the blockchain and simultaneously replicating those elements
across the entire network to prevent alteration.100
The potential applications of blockchain and smart contracts to create a
trust environment in the absence of effective institutions is endless.101 At its
most basic level of application, smart contracts could be used for financial
instruments, such as loans, that require certain pre-conditions, rate
negotiation, and performance by both parties with little room for
interpretation about that performance.102 Similarly, smart contracts could
help with public goods such as utilities or tolls, providing automated
deductions from user accounts upon receipt of service, and clear and
transparent conditions for when those deductions should occur and in what
amount.103 These solutions would be especially useful in a developing
country where lack of trust in the credit system leads to low levels of
automation. But beyond the hypothetical world of the value of smart
contracts in the developing country context, we can highlight a recent
practical example of their application to property titles in Honduras.
More than a decade ago, I wrote several articles describing the
seemingly intractable problem of land titling in many developing countries
where property titles are handed down through informal mechanisms, and
formal registrations are infiltrated by corruption.104 The inspiration for this
99

Id. at 333 (“This radical decentralization is what potentially makes smart contracting a
substitute for the state-based legal system, rather than an additional step before reaching that
system.”).
100 Marks, supra note 51, at 46-48 (providing a detailed explanation of the distributed
ledger process).
101 Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of
Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 334,
336 (2017) (describing the potential of blockchain technology to “change everything” with
respect to business applications).
102 Ryan Surujnath, Off the Chain! A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives Markets and the
Implications on Systemic Risk, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 271 (2017).
103 Alan Cohn, Travis West, & Chelsea Parker, Smart After All: Blockchain, Smart
Contracts, Parametric Insurance, and Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 273, 297–
303 (2017) (describing “smart grids” and “smart meters” as innovations in public utility
contracts).
104 See Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions in Economic Development,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2008) (explaining the evolution of informal legal institutions in
protecting rights outside of traditional legal mechanisms); see also Kevin J. Fandl, Dead
Capital and the Sea: Post-Tsunami Relief for the Southeast Asian Informal Economy, 1 YALE
J. INT’L AFF. 79 (2005) (discussing the challenges faced by informal landowners in India
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research was the work of Hernando de Soto, who wrote extensively about the
importance of transitioning informal landowners and informal business
owners into the formal economy— legalizing their titles—in order to
promote broader economic growth.105 And though his solution of
government-led formalization drew criticism,106 the underlying tenet of
providing a formal and immutable record of property titles remains valid and
important in economic development.
Of the 7.3 billion people in the world, only two billion have a title that
is legal and effective and public regarding their control over an asset
. . . When something is not legally on record as being owned, it can
therefore not be used . . . as collateral to get credit, as a credential that
you can be able to transfer part of your property to invite investment
in. Things are owned, but when they’re not adequately paperized or
recorded, they cannot fill the functions of creating capital and
credit.107

Property titles in Honduras, like in many countries, are maintained using
paper records that are held by government offices (usually notarios). In 2017,
roughly 80% of Honduran property was either untitled or improperly titled.108
Coupled with a weak institutional environment, this left property holders in
the delicate predicament of being challenged in their title to the land that they
occupy, or threatened with occupation or violence in the absence of payment
to what has been termed the “land mafia.”109
Austin-based startup Factom proposed in 2015 to help Honduras by
building a blockchain-based land registry to replace the existing paper-based
system.110 According to the press release made when the company decided
following a devastating tsunami that led to property ownership debates).
105 See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERY-WHERE ELSE (2000).
106 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta & Andrei Shleifer, Informality and Development, 28 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 109 (2014) (calling de Soto’s theory the “romantic” view of informality); Juana
Paola Bustamante I. and Kevin J. Fandl, Incentivizing Gray Market Entrepreneurs in
Emerging Markets, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 415 (2017).
107 Marks, supra note 51, at 66 (alteration omitted) (quoting Laura Shin, Republic of
Georgia to Pilot Land Titling on Blockchain with Economist Hernando De Soto, BitFury,
FORBES (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/ sites/laurashin/2016/04/21/republic-ofgeorgia-to-pilot-land-titling-on-blockchain-with-economist-hernando-de-sotobitfury/#5ba9f8444da3) (quoting Hernando De Soto, Signing Ceremony at the Georgian
Ministry of Justice (Apr. 15, 2016)).
108 Rina Chandran, Modernizing land records in Honduras can help stem violence, says
analyst, REUTERS, (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-honduras-landrightstech/modernizing-land-records-in-honduras-can-help-stem-violence-says-analyst-idUSKB
N1AR151.
109 Id.
110 Honduras to Build Land Title Registry Using Bitcoin Technology, FACTOM BLOG, (May
19, 2015), https://www.factom.com/company/blog/honduras-to-build-land-title-registryusing-Bitcoin-technology/.
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to engage in this effort, they said of Honduras that “[t]he country’s database
was basically hacked. So bureaucrats could get in there and they could get
themselves beachfront properties.”111 Their goal was “putting all of the
government’s land titles on the blockchain.”112 It was an ambitious but noble
project to say the least.
The basic idea was simple. All land titles would be relocated or created
on a new peer-to-peer blockchain network whereby anyone who wanted
access to the titles would have it.113 With a blockchain in place, registrations
would have to be carefully entered to ensure accurate and complete records,
knowing that changing a record (for legitimate or illegitimate reasons) would
be nearly impossible. Transfers of land would be seamless, with titles open
and obvious, and new registrants added to the blockchain without room for
fraud.
The Honduran experiment was a brilliant first step toward utilizing
blockchain technology to resolve some of the developing world’s most
corruption-laden, institution-based problems. However, we will never know
if it would have worked because it was never implemented in Honduras.114
The Honduran government never actually signed the agreement touted in the
press, and it seems that they never intended to. Critics later suggested that
Factom and similar blockchain supporters often miss the complexity of
developing country politics: “[b]y assuming the problem is mainly about
bureaucratic inefficiencies and paper-based processes, Bitcoin enthusiasts
ignore the hardest part of the situation: long-standing conflicts over rights
and power.”115
Subsequent to this failed experiment, other governments have begun
looking for ways to implement blockchain technology and Bitcoins to help
secure administrative processes, such as property titling.116 Some have
successfully implemented blockchain titles, including the small town of
South Burlington, Vermont,117 which, working with a startup company
known as Propy, transitioned their property deeds to the Ethereum
111

Id.
Id.
113 Marks, supra note 51, at 67 (explaining the Factom CEO’s goal of leapfrogging archaic
paper-based titling systems in other parts of the world).
114 Id. at 68.
115 Chelsea Barabas & Ethan Zuckerman, Can Bitcoin Be Used For Good?, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr.
7,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/Bitcoinhype/477141/.
116 Laura Shin, Republic of Georgia to Pilot Land Titling on Blockchain with Economist
Hernando De Soto, BitFury, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/
2016/04/21/republic-of-georgia-to-pilot-land-titling-on-blockchain-with-economisthernando-de-soto-bitfury/#5ba9f8444da3 (explaining that Georgia, Sweden, Honduras and
the City of Chicago have begun implementing this technology into government-related
transactions).
117 Here’s What a Blockchain Property Deed Looks Like, GOVTECH BIZ, (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.govtech.com/ biz/Heres-What-a-Blockchain-Property-Deed-Looks-Like.html.
112

356

Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm Efficiency?
40:333 (2020)

blockchain.118 Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) is applying blockchain and smart contracts to facilitate property
titling in India as part of a pilot project meant to avoid many of the same
problems faced in Honduras and other developing countries.119 Several other
initiatives have been attempted in countries from Japan to Sweden.120
These experiments in applying blockchain and smart contracts to
difficult contractual scenarios in developing countries reflect two things: (1)
a realization that institutional reform is either too slow or too cumbersome to
resolve these issues; and, (2) an understanding that this technology is quickly
evolving and shows substantial promise in more effectively resolving these
issues than traditional means. This is not to say that there will not be
significant difficulties in creating a world that operates to some degree along
a blockchain rather than a traditional, human-controlled institution. I discuss
a few of these potential problems below.
A. Adoption
The fact that blockchain exists as an option for buyers and sellers does
not mean that they would utilize it in lieu of alternative methods. Change
always comes at a cost. This is especially true in more traditional societies in
which community practices are deeply embedded in the societal norms. This
has been frequently seen in experiments involving the introduction of more
productive mechanisms or approaches in a variety of contexts, a concept
known as bounded rationality.
The term “bounded rationality,” coined by Herbert A. Simon in 1957,
suggests that individuals make sub-optimal choices due to limited
information as well as environmental factors that influence their decisionmaking (such as friends and family).121 This theory has been used to explain
many seemingly irrational failures to adopt new techniques that would be
more productive, from cacao farming techniques in Cote d’Ivoire122 to

118 The blockchain of these titles can be accessed here: https://www.etherchain.org/
account/a188e5a3da203 f8ebc72ec7578532926dc1d3bec.
119 Alexandru Oprunenco & Chami Akmeemana, Using blockchain to make land registry
more reliable in India, UNDP BLOG, (May 1, 2018), https://www.undp.org/content/undp/
en/home/blog/2018/Using-blockchain-to-make-land-registry-more-reliable-in-India.html
(describing the potential for blockchain and smart contracts to alleviate corruption in property
titling in India).
120 Blockchain in Government Tracker, THE ILLINOIS BLOCKCHAIN INITIATIVE https://
airtable.com/universe/expsQEGKoZO2lExKK/blockchain-in-government-tracker
(last
visited Feb. 22 2020) (tracking government efforts to transition to blockchain, mostly in the
land registry sector).
121 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957).
122 ALAIN DE JANVRY, KAREN MACOURS & ELISABETH SADOULET, LEARNING FOR
ADOPTING: TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY AGRICULTURE 62 (2016) (using
bounded rationality to explain why farmers in the Ivory Coast failed to adopt available
technologies that would improve their yields).
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spending decisions in India.123
We have already seen in the failed Honduras experiment that
governments may have cause to be hesitant in adopting blockchain and smart
contract technology. Similar to an individual’s hesitation to abandon past
traditions, the bureaucrats’ rationale for rejecting adoption of this technology
is likely to be deeply rooted in corruption, which has historically provided
them with undeserved benefits.124 And though the current institutional
architecture is inefficient and ripe with problems, abandoning that system for
an untested and seemingly ethereal promise of efficiency and transparency is
a big risk.
What may be needed to overcome this fear is an incentive. Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler provide one possibility in their book, Nudge,
which suggests that human behavior falls into certain routines that, once
established, are exceedingly difficult to change.125 Their argument is that
people make choices based on the desire to have control over those choices,
and when they are given a “choice architecture” that provides them with
desirable options and makes them believe that they are in control of their
decision-making, they tend to choose those options.
In the case of adopting blockchain and smart contract technology, useful
incentives may come from a variety of sources, such as successful
implementation in peer-countries; a desire to be the first-mover among a
given community of countries; or broader international incentives, such as
membership in elite organizations like the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).126 Internally, parties may be more
inclined to adopt this technology if they see it in operation amongst their
peers, which may be the result of cross-border contracts in which their
counterparts in other parts of the world utilize smart contract provisions.
B. Trust and Technology
The degree to which a user might utilize blockchain to facilitate a
business transaction is largely related to their familiarity with technology in
general and their willingness to trust that technology. This would suggest that
more tech-savvy individuals could become early adopters of blockchain for
123 Dean E. Spears, Bounded Rationality as Deliberation Costs: Theory and Evidence from
a Pricing Field Experiment in India, (CEPS, Working Paper No. 195, 2009) (explaining an
experiment in the sale of soap in rural India and finding that the negative effects of bounded
rationality disproportionately fall upon the poor).
124 Enrique Aldaz-Carrol & Eduardo Aldaz-Carrol, Can cryptocurrencies and blockchain
help fight corruption?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/future-development/2018/02/01/can-cryptocurrencies-and-blockchain-help-fightcorruption/ (explaining the features of blockchain, such as transparency, that could work to
eliminate corruption in public sector transactions).
125 CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD M. THALER, NUDGE 40-52 (2008).
126 The OECD requires members to adopt their anti-corruption convention among other
things.
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business, but their ability to rely on that technology is largely dependent upon
the technical expertise and trust of the counterparty to the arrangement.
Bitcoin is an example of blockchain technology, and its adoption by some
merchants, though certainly not a majority, reflects the gradual growth of
trust in the technology.127
Accepting Bitcoin as a means to transact business is utilized as an
alternative to existing currencies and other technologies, such as Apple Pay.
When a merchant chooses to accept Bitcoin for payment, they are hedging
their risk by maintaining a number of different payment options. Most of
these companies see Bitcoin as a very small aspect of their currency
portfolios. Because Bitcoin is not seeking to replace the existence of
traditional currency, it is not seen as a threat to business or governance. 128
The use of smart contracts has a potentially larger effect on the
institutional environment than Bitcoin. Smart contracts purportedly eliminate
the need for courts, judges, arbitrators, and even lawyers in crafting,
interpreting, and enforcing a contract. In the distant future, with artificial
intelligence far more advanced than it is today, the possibility of the key
business document—the contract—replacing the entire institutional
apparatus built around it seems surprisingly possible.129 This would forever
shift the institutional environment, reducing the importance of the judge as
the purveyor of contractual interpretation and replacing him or her with predetermined code that would seemingly evolve to take into account mounds
of data from precedent, best practices, industry standards, and so forth. The
potential for an omnipotent interpreter in the form of a computer program
could well be on the horizon.
Yet none of this theoretical world of the future will change the
underlying mistrust that humans were embedded within their own genetic
code: “the need for trust will not be obliterated but rather shifts from central
authorities towards algorithms that govern users’ interactions.”130 The advent
127 Yoni Blumberg, Here’s how you can—and can’t—spend Bitcoin, CNBC (Dec. 7,
2017), https://www.cnbc. com/2017/12/07/heres-how-you-can-and-cant-spend-Bitcoin.html
(explaining that over 100,000 merchants worldwide accept Bitcoin today).
128 See Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Turns 10: Still Not All Grown Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/Bitcoin-turns-10-still-not-all-grown-up-1540987201
(explaining that consumers prefer the perks with traditional bank credit cards that do not come
with Bitcoins).
129 But see STAN. UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030: ONE HUNDRED YEAR
STUDY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,46-47 (2016) (hereinafter “Stanford Study”),
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861/f/ ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf
(“Contrary to the more fantastic predictions for AI in the popular press, the Study Panel found
no cause for concern that AI is an imminent threat to humankind.
No machines with self-sustaining long-term goals and intent have been developed, nor are
they likely to be developed in the near future.”).
130 Florian Hawlitschek et al., The limits of trust-free systems: A literature review on
blockchain technology and trust in the sharing economy, 29 ELECTRONIC COM. RES.&
APPLICATIONS 50, 57 (2018).
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of machines to replace humans has caused uproar and revolution throughout
history, yet these instances have largely related to physical substitution rather
than mental. More recently, the application of technology to replace human
thought processes has brought with it a more existential debate about whether
we trust machines as decision-makers and interpreters of human actions.131
Scientists working in this area urge citizens to remain calm and not to fear a
fundamental shift in control from humans to computers, and emphasize that
regulation and other efforts to cease development in AI is likely to drive
research underground into a much more dangerous environment.132
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Smart contracts will not replace traditional contracts or the need to
encourage effective institutional environments.133 A host of elements arise
out of traditional contract processes, from assessing defenses to enforcement
(e.g., unconscionability) to deciphering the validity of the contract formation
in the first instance (e.g., duress).134
The distributed ledger technology (DLT) that is at the heart of
blockchain and smart contracts has tremendous potential to lend efficiency,
fairness, transparency, and trust to our interactions with others. The openness
and transparency alone provide an opportunity to overcome bureaucratic
inefficiency and corruption by shining a bright light on the actions of
government officials, corporations, and individuals, disincentivizing bad
behavior.135 Similarly, locking-in those transactions through a blockchainapproach ensures that people are true to their word (or actions) and cannot
renege on their “smart” promises.136
The technology apparent in smart contracts today may seem more of a
novelty than a true revolution in contracting.137 After all, parties are still
drafting terms in the form of programming code; humans are still negotiating
conditions so as to instruct the computers to execute actions on the basis of
those conditions; and parties still need to provide the funds (i.e., Bitcoins)
and assets called for by the contract. Are they truly smarter than traditional
contracts? Some authors have argued that smart contracts are simply
upgrades to the existing contract landscape and offer nothing more than
131 See generally Drew Simshaw, Ethical Issues in Robo-Lawyering: The Need for
Guidance on Developing and Using Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 174, 176 (2018) (highlighting the gaps in legal regulation over the use of
artificial intelligence in the provision of legal services).
132 See Stanford Study, supra note 129.
133 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 317-318 (2017) (arguing that smart contracts fail
to fully satisfy the doctrinal requirements of contract law).
134 Id. at 318.
135 Marks, supra note 51, at 76-77 (describing the visibility that DLTs provide into the
movement of money and assets along a blockchain).
136 Id. at 77 (discussing the immutability of DLT records).
137 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 344-350.
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added efficiencies.138
What I intended to do in this short article is to introduce the foundational
question of whether blockchain technology offers a reasonable alternative to
institutional reform for both simple and complex contractual transactions,
especially in emerging markets. Technology has made our cities smarter with
smart grids, meters, tolls, and so forth. It has made our health better with big
data analysis, robotic surgery, and early detection systems. Will it make
global business smarter by breaking down one of the key barriers to trade
between unrelated parties—trust? If it does, will this stimulate economic
growth in emerging markets, or will political intervention slow the train of
progress? These are key questions that we need to be asking.

138 See, e.g., ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES:
A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 2 (2016); Not-So-Clever Contracts, ECONOMIST (July 28,
2016), https://www.economist.com/ news/business/21702758-time-being-least-humanjudgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted.
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